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This paper looks at programming strategies adopted by Chinese television producers, 
drawing on an ongoing large-scale study of Asia-Pacific television format trade currently 
being conducted by the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy. The paper 
argues that the concept of cultural technology transfer is a useful way of theorizing the 
positive benefits of program replication in China. On the other hand, the negative effect 
is that dynamics of program development and innovation are retarded by excessive 
reliance on the cloning of formats.  
 
My first visit to the Middle Kingdom was in 1989, the Year of the Snake, an auspicious 
time in the Chinese lunar calendar, although not so fortunate for thousands of protestors 
in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square during the spring of late May and early June. The Western 
media were there in numbers and chose to see the protests through the lens of a popular 
democratic groundswell – the kind of civil society movement that was sweeping Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s. In the cold light of hindsight, the burning issues were adjudged 
to be mass dissatisfaction with official corruption and rampant inflation. As Geremie 
Barmé and Linda Jaivin have noted, other grievances and demands also fueled the 
student-led dissent - from calls for greater press independence to better university 
conditions. The ‘democracy movement’ was an expedient device employed by the 
protestors to hook CNN and a global audience.1  
Meanwhile the Chinese media moved into propaganda overdrive mode. The print 
media provided editorial ‘rectification’ and television offered a mixed diet of news and 
eyewitness accounts. After the Chinese government’s denunciations of the Tiananmen 
Square ‘incident’ had played out, Chinese television returned to business as usual. As a 
person used to the often seamless programming flows of Western networks, Chinese 
television at the time seemed to me to offer a chaotic schedule that juxtaposed news 
documentaries, travelogues of ancient Middle Kingdom wonders, randomly interrupted 
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by footage of the People’s Liberation Army in action, scaling buildings and breaking 
bricks on their heads (just in case of another mass disturbance or invasion by the 
renegade state of Taiwan). This pattern was interspersed with variety shows that featured 
comic dialogues, Beijing opera, and traditional song. 
  Returning regularly over the past twelve years I have been amazed by the 
development of Chinese programming. The Chinese television industry is currently in a 
state of unprecedented flux. With the largest television audience in the world, serviced by 
the most number of television stations, the industry is having to adjust to the logic of 
supply and demand within an environment of market fragmentation. Television schedules 
are now more systematically attuned to audience demands. Prime time is dedicated to 
high-rating programs, and most significantly, there are plenty of channels, although the 
content across channels lacks real diversity. Like the Chinese economy in general the 
television industry is evidence of what the Chinese call ‘duplicate construction’ (chongfu 
jianshe), that is, everyone rushes in and produces the same kinds of products and targets 
the same markets within a particular locality.2 The small scale of many stations means 
that you have a lot of under-capitalised television stations that swap programs on a barter 
basis.  
 The result has been an uncompetitive television industry with the emphasis more on 
maintaining supply than confronting demand: in other words, an atypical television 
market where filling schedules has been seen to be of greater importance than filling 
station coffers. Stations exchange programs based on the idea of reciprocity. If station X 
accept station Y's programs, then Y will usually take X's program. This same market 
logic applies to program packages exchanged between cable stations. Although this 
strategy does circulate content, it doesn’t really generate any substantial capital that 
might be used for program development. However, the situation is changing. Whereas 
smaller stations maintain a steady supply of content through bartering, many of the larger 
provincial and metropolitan broadcasters are learning that the fundamentals of supply and 
demand are intricately related to pricing mechanisms that in turn depend on the 
regulation of scarcity. That is, when a program is widely circulated or plagiarized, the 
market value of the original generally diminishes. In the rush to exploit successful 
content these market truths are often disregarded. 
 The manner in which programming is circulated leads me to suggest that Chinese 
television programming departments act as content facilitators rather than as innovators. 
It is not differentiated quality programming that is sought after, but any readily available 
content that can fill the schedules and satisfy the expectations of officials and audiences. 
In a transition from ‘engineers of the soul’ towards content facilitators, Chinese television 
producers have learnt how to balance interests. The history of program development in 
China over the past two decades can be understood in the context of a nation moving out 
of a planned cultural economy monitored by vigilant officials into a profit-oriented 
system in which content facilitators (including television station managers) increasingly 
look to foreign models to gather audiences.  
 The standard model to explain China’s evolving media landscape is that of a 
transition from plan to market in which commercial aspirations are balanced by official 
culture. The central feature of the ‘plan to market’ model is that it sets up an opposition 
between the state as the engineer of culture and the market as the driver of efficiency. 
However, in focusing on this opposition the model neglects processes by which creative 
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ideas and practices are diffused across national systems. A phrase that has arisen in 
critical debate in China better captures the sense of compromise: television producers 
need to please the ‘three olds’ (san lao). This refers to lao ganbu (old cadres or officials), 
lao baixing (the audience/people), and laoban (the market/ investors)3. This triad of 
interests contribute to the gate-keeping process by which ideas find expression on the 
small screen. The vigilance of officials is mediated by the demands of bringing about a 
more competitive television industry. Official gate-keepers include Chinese Communist 
Party Propaganda Department directors within television stations. That is not to say, 
however, that this prevents the airing of programs that might be problematic. In many 
cases these officials will promote entertainment programming from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan over didactic documentary to placate the business interests of the station and the 
demands of its perceived audience. In order to understand the nature of the compromise 
we need to briefly examine the background of television in China. 
 
History and development 
 
Although television was first broadcast in China on 1 May 1958, it was not until the 
1980s that the medium really came of age. Its arrival in the Middle Kingdom had 
coincided with stringent Communist Party control of the arts. During its initial years 
television development was hampered by a lack of technical infrastructure and the fact 
that ownership of television receivers was extremely limited. During the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76), a time when Maoist red guard propaganda 
was rampant and class deviation could be a capital offence, television broadcasts were 
limited to overt propaganda, mostly recreations of Madame Mao’s favorite revolutionary 
operas. It was only after the chaos of that turbulent decade that Chinese television 
programming began to evolve. This was fueled by the development of a domestic 
production industry that allowed ordinary families to aspire to own a television set. 
During the period from 1984 to 1990 the number of terrestrial stations increased 
from 93 to 509.4 By 1995, there were reportedly 2740 television channels including 
educational channels and cable stations. Television programs were being beamed off 
96,530 ground relay stations to China's remote regions. China's rollout of cable exceeded 
1,340,000 kilometers. 5  
Until recently the Chinese television industry fell under the regulatory control of 
the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT), under the supervision of the State 
Council, the principal organ of legislative government. Policy-making was invariably 
directed at maintaining a viable domestic industry, overseeing management, and 
monitoring content. In 1998 at the First Session of the Ninth People’s Congress, the 
MRFT was downgraded to the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT) and the responsibility for the overall coordination of the information sector was 
passed over to a new super ministry, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), an 
amalgamation of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and Electronics 
Industry (MEI). Whereas the MII is responsible for development strategies, particularly 
in relation to policies, laws and regulations impacting upon the ‘information economy’ 
the SARFT retains the capacity to license and censor content on broadcasting networks 
and to manage the country’s existing broadcast infrastructure.  
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 In contrast to privately owned and operated media systems in mixed economies, 
China’s broadcasters are not consolidated into competitive networks, but rather operate 
according to geographically determined logistics premised on the ideal of assuring 
information and propaganda reaches all segments of society. Television broadcasters are 
organized on four administrative levels headed by the national broadcaster China Central 
Television (CCTV) in China’s capital, Beijing. The second level finds thirty-seven 
provincial broadcasters, the third level has 218 city stations, while the final administrative 
level comprises county stations, many of which are actually relay stations.6 However, the 
number is rapidly diminishing as the geographical determinism is undermined by new 
delivery platforms such as satellite and cable. Technological changes in delivery 
platforms have changed the focus from mass audiences to fragmented audiences with 
Shanghai Cable Television moving to implement near video-on-demand (NVOD) 
services and Guangdong Cable Television providing digital services through cable 
modem. As the paper is published new developments are being enacted which will 
impact upon the strategic business plans of China’s broadcasting sector. Enforced 
rationalization has occurred under a new broadcasting law formulated by the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT).7  
 The need to accommodate ‘the three olds’ (officials, audience, and market) gives 
Chinese television a schizophrenic appearance. Monolithic enterprises such as the 
national network CCTV, now operating nine channels, function as public broadcasters in 
theory but are commercially oriented in practice, although the CCTV diet of news, 
documentary, and ‘mainstream melody’ television drama is hardly adventurous 
programming. The term ‘mainstream melody’ refers to narratives that encapsulate 
changes in society since the Deng Xiaoping led reforms gave people the green light to 
pursue personal wealth. It effectively displaces socialist realism as the normative 
benchmark for narrative forms.8 Both CCTV and Beijing Television (BTV) now use 
private production companies to outsource programming. In 1997 CCTV also floated part 
of the capital of its Wuxi Production Base in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, a move 
followed by Shanghai Oriental Pearl Television.9 These stations maximize profits 
through conventional means such as exploiting the value of content for advertising, as 
well as through horizontal integration into services such as real estate and tourism. 
Indeed, the spate of new alliances between television companies and foreign financed 
non-broadcasting companies – Internet portals, advertising, tourism, and real estate 
companies – is a strategic maneuver to draw investment by the ‘back door’. 
  In contrast to the conservatism of CCTV, there are quasi-commercial enterprises 
such as Hunan Satellite Television, a broadcaster operating within the organizational 
umbrella of the Hunan TV& Broadcast Intermediary Ltd. (TVBI) that offer a range of 
entertainment programming carefully targeted at particular demographics. Hunan 
Satellite Television’s popular youth shows such as The Citadel of Happiness (Kuaile da 
benying) and Romantic Meeting (Meigui zhiyue) have established audience loyalty. The 
Citadel of Happiness is a teen show hosted by Li Xiang and He Ling. Modeled on 
Taiwanese youth entertainment television formats, it features interviews with pop groups 
and celebrities. Romantic Meeting is a dating show that is based on the cable success of 
the Taiwanese television show Special Man and Woman (Feichang nannu).10 Both 
programs target China’s generation x, the ‘next’ generation, the youth who have grown up 
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post-Cultural Revolution in one-child families.11 In 2000 TVBI received approval to issue 
shares to individual and institutional investors. TVBI - incidentally emerging from the 
home province of China’s great communicator, Mao Zedong - has recently expanded into 
financing a province wide broadband cable network, and has developed new financial 
information programming.12  
 
Genres of programming 
 
The most ubiquitous form of programming in China is television drama. However, the 
supremacy of television drama in television schedules is being challenged by new 
program innovations, mostly copied from neighboring television landscapes in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Japan. In the past programs have been generically classified into three 
groups: news (news broadcasts, current affairs), arts and entertainment (variety shows, 
dramas, game shows, and music), and education (talk show, children’s shows, university 
programs). Demand for new content due to an increase in the number of cable providers 
in the past decade has in turn put pressure on stations to experiment with new genres and 
seek out new program formats. This has not been an easy transition as the Chinese 
television industry has not exactly been a creative milieu.  
The shift from a restricted archive of officially sanctioned content towards a 
marketplace in which content flows within television industry trade routes requires a new 
theoretical model of cultural exchange. Yuri Lotman, writing about Russian literature, 
identified five ‘stages’ to characterize the process whereby foreign texts are received and 
host cultures subsequently restructured.13 According to Lotman, the first stage is where 
the foreign texts hold an aura, and are valued as somehow true and beautiful.14 By way of 
contrast, the texts (or programs) of the host culture are devalued as being inferior or 
coarse. Lotman’s heuristic model can also be applied to China’s opening to the global 
community. As Chinese people gradually tuned into an increasing amount of imported 
television programming during the mid-1980s, the ‘foreign’, with its superior production 
aesthetics soon assumed the mantle of the true and the beautiful. Unfortunately there are 
no ethnographic surveys from the mid-1980s to corroborate the popularity of foreign 
programs but anecdotal evidence and a few scholarly reports reveal a fetishization of 
foreign programs in particular by young educated Chinese. Foreign programs that were 
spoken of as new and aesthetically pleasing during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
included the US- produced The Man from Atlantis, and the BBC produced dramas Anna 
Karenina, David Copperfield, and Robinson Crusoe.15 
  The second stage is where the ‘imported’ texts and the ‘home’ culture restructure 
each other. In this stage ‘translations, imitations and adaptations multiply.’16 We find 
ample evidence in television drama. Following the enthusiastic reception of foreign 
drama from Japan and Hong Kong, China Central Television (CCTV) produced the first 
domestic serial drama (lianxu ju).  Eighteen Years in the Enemy Camp (Diying shiba 
nian), appeared on Chinese television screens in February 1981 and ran nine episodes.17 
A story about a Chinese commando force, Eighteen Years in the Enemy Camp was a 
blatant attempt to copy the Western action-thriller genre that had begun to appear on 
Chinese television screens. However, it received a mixed by domestic critics, even being 
labeled ‘capitalist spiritual pollution’, in part due to unfamiliarity with the genre, and in 
part due to its aping of the Western models. The lukewarm reception may also have been 
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due to its rather blatant propagandizing at a time when many people were still getting 
over the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. More successful genre adaptations followed 
in the 1990s, including the 1990 serial Aspirations (Kewang), sometimes referred to 
China’s first soap opera, and the acclaimed 1991 series Stories From an Editorial Office 
(Bianji bu de gushi), dubbed China’s first sit-com. The events portrayed in Stories From 
an Editorial Office revolve around circulation problems at the office of the magazine 
Renjian zhinan (Guide for Living). Attracting new readers becomes the focus for the 
entrepreneurial members of the office. The golden road to financial success is adjudged 
to be changing the direction of the magazine to embrace a more tabloid format. The 
adventures of the staff in pulling off this transformation provide the humor. While the 
serial Aspirations paved the way for a number of successful melodramatic serials, it was 
a while before the episodic sit-com was revisited.18  
The third stage is where the higher content of the imported text is re-inscribed in 
the local, reinvigorating the meaning of the imported texts by its association with the 
purer local version. This could be somewhat cynically entitled the ‘with Chinese 
characteristics’ syndrome.19  It has become somewhat of a standard refrain that when a 
foreign text, philosophy, or policy is adopted by China, it is branded as being a case of 
“x” with “Chinese characteristics”, the implication being that the work has been 
improved in the process of adaptation. For instance, in 1982 Shandong Television 
produced a ‘kung-fu’ serial (Wu Song) based on the adventures of a character from the 
popular classic Outlaws of the Marsh (Shui hu chuan). The scriptwriters' desire to 
recreate the hero as an honorable person, in line with Communist dictates about how 
‘heroes’ should behave had the effect not only of bastardizing the original classic but also 
alienating many viewers who rejected the blatant politicization of the narrative.20 Similar 
processes of political purification occurs in the 1986 remake of the Qing Dynasty love 
story Dream of the Red Chamber (Hong lou meng) which became a lesson in the 
decadence of feudal nobility, and the sanctioned version of life of China’s last emperor 
(Modai huangdi), an attempt to set the record straight after the international success of 
the ‘foreign movie’, also entitled The Last Emperor.  
The fourth stage is where the imported texts are entirely dissolved in the receiving 
culture. Lotman notes: ‘the culture itself changes to a state of activity and begins rapidly 
to produce new texts; these texts are based on cultural codes which in the distant past 
were stimulated by invasions from outside, but which now have been wholly transformed 
through the many asymmetrical transformations into a new and original structural 
model.’21  The fifth stage is where the receiving culture becomes a sending culture. The 
foreign text being absorbed, cleansed, and Sinicised, the host culture then becomes an 
originator of the product. It is not hard to think of the myriad examples of texts that are 
‘owned’ by the home culture but are in reality derivative, as the ensuing discussion of 
formats will reveal. The presentation style of news programs such as the national news 
bulletin and the current affairs program Talking Point (Jiaodian fangtan) on China 
Central Television owe as much to ‘global’ news formats as to Chinese journalistic 
traditions.    
 Before moving on to discuss formats, it is worth mentioning the thematic 
isomorphism that pervades China’s television drama. In 1993 a famous television drama 
was produced called Beijingers in New York (Beijing ren zai Niuyue). It created a 
sensation, depicting the lives of a Chinese couple resident in New York. The series played 
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off a fascination with overseas fever (chuguo re) and the exploits of expatriates, most of 
whom had gone to the West as students and achieved some measure of financial gain. 
Although Beijingers portrayed a ‘rags to riches’ story, it ended in riches turning to rags, 
the protagonist losing his money and his dignity. However, the ensuing ratings success 
for the producers spawned a sudden increase of dramas about Chinese people in strange 
environments, and foreigners (waiguo ren) in China.22 For instance, Shanghai Natives in 
Tokyo (Shanghai ren zai Dongjing), Russian Girls in Harbin (Eluosi guniang zai 
Haerbin), Chinese Girls in Western Business (Yanghangli de Zhongguo xiaojie), and The 
New World (Xin dalu) to name but a few. In this genre issues of moral conflict and 
cultural identity provide the raw material for narratives of place and belonging.  
Inevitably the success of one product leads so a glut of imitators, as has been 
demonstrated by the production line of ‘Royal Court dramas’ in recent years.23 These 
‘costume dramas’ are stories of dynastic struggle from the pages of Chinese history. The 
over-abundance has even led the Ministry of Culture to move to persuade television 
production houses from saturating the market and threatening China’s export of these 
dramas to other countries.     
 
Formats and cultural technology transfer 
Interactive television, Internet-related television programs, new media, 
new technologies and convergence all offer great scope for devisors. The 
new age that is dawning in television is a new age for the devisor 
John Gough, International format consultant 24 
As attempts to recreate and replicate the success of ‘foreign’ genres has demonstrated, the 
viability of television industries in the People’s Republic of China is directly linked to a 
content deficit that has resulted in the cannibalization of ideas, or what is euphemistically 
known in the Chinese industry as ‘cloning’ (kelong). The appropriation of foreign formats 
is directly related to the relative adolescence of the Chinese television industry and 
producers’ attempts to come to terms with supply-demand economics. The extent of 
cloning of foreign television formats and genres is also related to the vast scale of the 
Chinese television landscape, a fact that makes effective administration difficult. 
While Chinese producers have borrowed ideas from foreign television systems 
over the past two decades, the exploitation of television formats is a recent phenomenon. 
In an environment of immature media industries confronting change from state subsidy to 
deregulated self-reliance, from mass delivery of content to customized service industry 
models, any content that captures audience segments without necessitating huge outlays 
of investment is manna from heaven. Copying formats saves R & D and obviates the 
risks associated with new program development. With television producers in China now 
moving from genre imitation to format appropriation in order to maximize audiences with 
a minimum of program development cost, the immediate future of Chinese television 
looks both uninteresting and un-enterprising.  
Knowing which formats work, however, does not necessarily translate into market 
success. In China program one person’s success often becomes another’s gravy train. 
Television concepts and ideas are swiftly copied, modified, and exploited by neighboring 
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stations desperate to put together successful programs to keep their station leaders happy. 
The format is therefore a recipe, a package, or more particularly combination of 
technologies that enables change in media systems. In this sense technology may be 
defined as ‘simply knowledge about techniques, to which some significant degree of 
reliability or dependability is attached by those possessing it.’ 25 The term ‘cultural 
technology’ on the other hand is conventionally derived from the work of the Canadian 
communication scholar Marshall McLuhan to refer to advances in communication – a 
continuum from Sumerian ideographs through alphabets to printing, photography, 
television, Internet and so on.  However, the term cultural technology has a more direct 
connotation to events in the PRC if it linked to the idea of knowledge and information, as 
in the first definition. If we assume that propaganda is the manipulation of information 
for political purposes (it was devised as such), its deployment is based upon a belief in its 
methodology, its reliability, and its dependability – even though this is often assumed. 
Likewise, advertising is often described as propaganda, even more so when political 
parties engage the services of advertising companies. The techniques used in political 
canvassing draw upon behavioral psychology, professional expertise that is said to have 
some degree of reliability; in this case in effecting a change in the mentality of voting 
populations. It is not surprising then that political propaganda in China is studying the 
techniques used in the advertising industries. 
Having made this connection between power and persuasion, I want to suggest 
that all forms of the entertainment media are a cultural technology in that they aim to 
attract your attention, to keep your attention, and in the case of commercial television, to 
sell your attention to advertisers. In this sense, programming decisions are based upon 
codified knowledge, arts festivals are commissioned on marketing knowledge, and even 
the more avant-garde forms of art identify an audience. As the government cash cow gets 
thinner and thinner it means that commercialization becomes more specialized. Flagship 
companies employ marketing experts, television networks niche broadcast, new ways of 
producing, directing, editing, and distribution are sought after to remain competitive.  
Cultural technology transfer is accordingly the transmission of such knowledge. 
Generally speaking the term technology transfer connotes transfer of materials, designs, 
scientific papers, databases etc. In the cultural sphere it means applying new methods, 
whether these come form overseas or are originated in China. The idea of cultural 
technology transfer presents an interesting shift from text-based explanations, and allows 
us to take into account the dynamics of flows whereby measurable economic benefit 
accrues to the appropriator often at the expense of the originator of content. At the same 
time ideas, policies and organizational practices are introduced into the receiving system. 
The idea of cultural technology transfer thus has two edges. In a material sense a cultural 
commodity is formed; in the other sense the success of commodity – its consumption, or 
in the case of a television program, its ratings – leads to further appropriation of the 
technology. An example of how the commodity form emerges is provided by the 
introduction of acrylic paints to the Papunya aboriginal community in Australia by a 
young white schoolteacher, Geoff Bardon in the early 1970s. This technology allowed the 
sacred art of the Western Desert people to be commercially produced and modified. In 
this way a cultural maintenance practice was subsumed into the supply-demand 
mechanisms of Western art markets.26 The actual display and consumption of this artwork 
on a global scale served to change perceptions of aboriginal culture. The shift from the 
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community binding use value of culture to the commodity form is also characteristic of 
the evolving media market in China. The products of mass media, whether propaganda or 
general pedagogic content were prior to the 1980s not commodity forms. The success of 
foreign entertainment programs during the early 1980s, such as the Hong Kong martial 
arts series Huo Yianjia and the US series The Man From Atlantis, were a catalyst for 
understanding how innovations in mass culture could lead to economic glory for directors 
of television stations.       
The licensing, co-production, and adaptation of television formats in China 
presents an exemplary illustration of how cultural exchange is mediated within distorted 
market systems. Television formats are seen as a means of replicating successful 
programming outcomes in different markets. The format is thus a ‘cultural technology’ 
that can be used to add value to the recipient industry. Whereas knowledge of audience 
taste and predisposition garnered by market research is used to originate programs, a 
package of associated technologies is traded (under license) or appropriated without 
permission. As van Manen has pointed out, format transfer (in the formal sense at least) 
can include the provision of computer software for program credits, animation sequences, 
designer blueprints for such things as program sets and studio filming, film footage for 
insertion in the new program version of the format, and scripts for individual episodes.27  
Other technologies may also constitute a part of the transfer package. These include 
ratings information derived from audience surveys, programming details, and polls 
associated with the broadcast of the earlier program version of the format. Within the 
Chinese industry these are collectively referred to as ‘the Bible’ (tianshu).  Another 
technology that is frequently added to the value of the format itself is a consultancy 
service, wherein a production executive associated with the earlier program will act as 
adviser to a new production of the format.28 
 This idea of cultural technology entails looking at program flows from the lens of 
pragmatic internationalization rather than through the legacy of ‘effects’ models. The 
recipient broadcaster is in effect making a decision about the utility of the format package: 
the cost of replication is measured against the technical capacity to accommodate the 
format and provide local content. The cultural technology transfer model is therefore a 
way of bridging the gap between modernization theory that supposes that modern 
‘Western’ technology (and ways of organization) contribute to the inevitable transition 
from tradition to modernity, and media imperialism, which has tended to see foreign 
programming only as a threat to social values. In effect, the equation is not so 
straightforward. Like technology transfer itself the cultural technology transfer of format 
licensing and appropriation depends on the environment in which it is transplanted. 
Sometimes it takes, sometimes it doesn’t. 
 Cultural technology transfer therefore provides an alternative to the theoretical 
territory mined over by cultural studies where the emphasis has been largely on the 
association between textual representations and power. This is not to say that the 
technology transfer model dismisses power relations. On the contrary, the point is that 
cultural traffic routinely encompasses both textual and non-textual forms of exchange: 
ideas about government as well as industrial processes and protocols, which by moving 
from one locale to another result in intellectual, social and institutional re-configurations. 
The cultural technology transfer model therefore provides a timely critique of cultural 
imperialism - the doppelganger of Marxist political economy - which contends that 
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values encoded in foreign texts will be to the detriment of the recipient culture. For 
cultural imperialism it is all a case of one-way traffic, of super-information highways 
financed by powerful interests. Alternatively, the notion that something tangible is 
transferred suggests that adaptation and appropriation can be materially empowering for 
the recipient cultural formation. 
 An example of technology transfer in relation to television formats is Shanghai 
Television’s Sesame Street (Zhima jie) - under license to Children’s Television 
Workshop (CTW).  Sesame Street is broadcast to 140 countries, and has undergone a 
number of format adaptations in different languages. In 1996 the Sesame Street idiom of 
‘fun education’ was exported to the Middle Kingdom to undergo re-fashioning for the 
Chinese child, finally appearing on the small screen on Shanghai TV Channel 14 on 
February 14, 1998. The actual re-formatting of the CTW ‘model’ was a complicated 
procedure, requiring extensive work-shopping both on a technical and political level. The 
Chinese contributed a team of eighteen child education specialists, headed by the 
renowned physicist and head of Fudan University, Professor Xie Xide. New characters 
such as Xiao Meizi (Little Berry) and Huhu Zhu (Puff Pig) were added to accommodate 
local idioms. Part of the technology transfer meant sending the Shanghai Television 
producers to New York to work with their American counterparts. This exchange was 
funded by the U.S. giant General Electric, which no doubt had its own commercial 
agenda. The outcome of the pre-production workshop and training was a reference 
volume outlining in detail the miniature of production. The program is now syndicated 
throughout China as are Sesame Street products and the CTW web-site. 
According to one enthusiastic report the sinicisation of Sesame Street was in the same 
order of technology transfer as the Sangtana motor vehicle, which borrowed German 
technology, workmanship and standards and applied Chinese materials and labor.29 The 
report further opines that Shanghai Television’s reputation, and Chinese pedagogic 
practice in general, benefited from the collaboration. Chinese children’s television had 
until the advent of Sesame Street been devised by adults. 
 
We used adult program formats and applied these mechanically to children’s content 
with the result that adults felt it was all infantile and children felt it was dreary. The 
reason for this is obvious: those who create children’s shows are adults and they are 
used to using adult thought processes to observe and regulate the world of children.        
 
The celebratory aspects of positive technology transfer and the liberation of children from 
adult visions of what childhood ought to be has ramifications for the relations between 
the institution of venerable teachers and that of mass media bean counters. What direction 
should children’s television go from here? Will there be more Chinese copies of the 
Sesame Street pedagogy or an official backlash against the democratisation of children’s 
education?    
A further example of how the introduction of a television format can provide recipient 
industries with cultural technology transfers is the case of Joy Luck Street (Xingfu jie), a 
television series co-production based on the long-running English melodrama Coronation 
Street. In this case Granada Media, the English copyright owner of Coronation Street, 
provided production capital through a venture with the Hongkong based Yahuan Audio 
and Video production Co. Ltd. and the Beijing Broadcasting Institute. According to one 
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of the Chinese production team Granada have invested one million RMB a year for three 
years, hoping that the series, screened on 90 cable channels in a special syndicated time 
slot called ‘6.30 Theatre’ will capture the hearts and minds of Chinese housewives.30 In 
order to make this production in China the Chinese team had to restructure many of their 
work practices to incorporate continuous script writing and shooting, working in rotating 
teams. 
The Chinese Joy Luck Street experience has been far from a seamless transfer of the 
original Coronation Street format into the Chinese environment. A number of difficulties 
were encountered in ‘transferring’ the nuances of the English working-class milieu into 
the Beijing streetscape. The original Hong Kong director had to be replaced after 18 
episodes and the narrative of dysfunctional families had to be reworked to accommodate 
mainland Chinese values. By the time the series had achieved 50 episodes the series had 
acquired a distinctive local feel. In Lotman’s typology of cultural transfer it had become 




The nature of the Chinese television industry is gradually changing. Rationalization and 
network alliance momentum within the Chinese television market and the impending 
accession to the World Trade Organization are both reasons to suggest that a more 
regulated ethic of competition will emerge in the years to come. Program development is 
an issue in relation to the larger provincial and city stations that have an interest in 
broadcasting high-rating material. For prospective new entrants into the Chinese market, 
however, the current epidemic of format duplication signals the anarchy of the Chinese 
television market. It is not enough to identify the kind of content that works, the task is 
making sure you brand your content and distribute it before it is cloned. 
Television format appropriation thus presents a paradox in terms of theorizing 
power relations. A move from one locale to another suggests a conveyance of ideas – 
ideas that may be progressive or regressive, liberating or enslaving, depending on one’s 
conception of the pedagogic value of popular culture. A virtuous cycle of sending and 
receiving formats becomes the means of the viability of a Chinese television industry 
bereft of imagination. Chinese television production units become the border-crossing 
station: the material site where cultural technology is transferred, as well as the symbolic 
site where meanings and ideas are traded. 
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